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MAINE LAW REVIEW
THE INVALIDATION OF THE MAINE
CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMITS LAW: A
VINDICATION OF DEMOCRACY
David A. Soley*
The people are the best judges who ought to represent them. To
dictate and control them, to tell them whom they shall not elect,
is to abridge their natural rights. [Term limits are] an absurd
species of ostracism.
_ Founding Father Robert Livingston
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 8, 1994, the voters of Maine enacted a term limits
law that arbitrarily limited the democratic right to vote for the can-
didate of their choice. The law provided that Maine's United States
Representatives could not appear on the ballot after six consecutive
years of service and that Maine's United States Senators could not
appear on the election ballot after twelve consecutive years of ser-
vice.' On May 26, 1995, the United States District Court for the
District of Maine found that the law was an unconstitutional viola-
tion of the Qualifications Clauses of the United States Constitution
and permanently enjoined the Maine Secretary of State and the
Maine Attorney General from implementing, carrying out, or en-
forcing the law.' This ruling vindicated a fundamental constitutional
principle that neither the United States Congress, the states, nor the
people themselves can limit the right of a United States citizen to
vote for the candidate of his choice.
This Article reviews the Maine Act,3 traces the history of the
Qualifications Clauses, analyzes the important cases that address
these provisions, and concludes that the Maine Act was an unconsti-
tutional violation of the Qualifications Clauses and an affront to our
nation's fundamental democratic principles. The United States Dis-
trict Court acted appropriately in striking it down.
* Partner, Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, P.C.; B.A., 1980, Bates College;
J.D., 1984, Emory University.
1. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 421 (West Supp. 1995-1996).
2. League of Women Voters v. Diamond, No. 94-377-P-H (D. Me. May 26, 1995).
3. This Article does not address the Maine Term Limitations Act of 1993, which
imposes term limits on state legislators and certain state officers. See ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §§ 551-554 (West Supp. 1995-1996).
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II. THE MAINE CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMITATIONs ACT
The Maine Congressional Term Limitations Act of 1994 was
passed as part of a nationwide political effort to limit the terms of
entrenched leadership in both the U.S. Senate and in the U.S.
House of Representatives.4 At the inception of the movement,
members of the Democratic party constituted a majority of the en-
trenched leadership in Congress, and the Republicans spearheaded
the term limits movement. When term limits proponents in Maine
failed to get their bill through the Democratic dominated Maine
Legislature, a ballot initiative campaign was mounted and the Act
was approved by referendum. Other states passed similar term lim-
its laws.5 Ironically, the same voters who were concerned about en-
trenchment in Congress also swept the Democrats out of control in
both the House and the Senate.6
The Maine Congressional Term Limitations Act of 1994 states
that its purpose is "[t]o prevent potential corruption in office by lim-
iting the number of terms Representatives and Senators may hold
[and] ... to preserve the integrity of the ballot by limiting the cor-
rupting influence and dominance of special interests upon en-
trenched incumbents."7 Term limits also allows more citizens to
hold public office.
To accomplish these objectives, the law forbids the Maine Secre-
tary of State from accepting or verifying signatures on any nomina-
4. See section 421(2) of title 21-A for the stated purpose of the term limits law.
See infra note 7.
5. As of 1994, term limits laws have been passed in Arizona. Arkansas, Califor-
nia, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota. Ohio.
Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Daniel Hays Lowenstein.
Are Congressional Term Limits Constitutional?, 18 HARv. J.L & Pun. Po'Y 1. 2-3
n.3 (1994).
6. The Maine Congressional Term Limitations Act and other term limits laws
throughout the country were enacted in the November 1994 general election. That
same election forced the Democrats out of power in both the U.S. Senate and House
of Representatives.
7. Title 21-A, § 421(2)(A)-(B). The Act further states:
2. Purpose and intent. The People of the State of Maine declare their
purpose and intent in enacting this legislation to be as follows.
C. To defend their right to stand for and hold public office by encourag-
ing a larger selection of candidates, and by curtailing the effects of en-
trenched incumbency, which discourages competitive elections, particularly
in primaries.
D. To protect and defend their right to equal protection of the laws by
giving more citizens of this state the opportunity to stand for and hold pub-
lic office.
E. To ensure that those who are elected to Congress will return to pri-
vate life to live in this state under the laws they have made while serving in
Congress.
Id § 421(2)(C)-(E).
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tion paper of any person who served in the U.S. House of
Representatives for six or more of the previous eleven years or who
served in the U.S. Senate for twelve or more of the previous seven-
teen years.' In other words, the names of Representatives from
Maine may not be put on the ballot if they have served three consec-
utive terms, and the names of Senators from Maine may not be
placed on the ballot if they have served two consecutive terms. The
law does not apply to write-in campaigns.9 Congressional service
prior to January 1, 1994, is not counted for the purposes of the
Act.l0
The upshot of all of this is that the Act limits Representatives
from Maine to three consecutive terms and Senators from Maine to
two consecutive terms. After that, a candidate can test his luck in a
write-in campaign, but cannot place his name on the official ballot.
On November 23, 1994, I challenged the constitutionality of the
Act on behalf of the League of Women Voters of Maine, League
President Alvin M. Moss, and the Maine Civil Liberties Union. The
Complaint set forth that the term limits law violates the Qualifica-
tions Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, the freedoms of expression
and association, the Equal Protection Clause," and the right of vot-
ers to vote for the candidate of their choice. The thrust of the chal-
lenge was based upon the Qualifications Clauses in Article I,
Sections 2 and 3, of the United States Constitution.
III. THE EvOLUTION OF THE QUALIFICATIONS CLAUSES
The qualifications for the office of U.S. Senator are established by
and set forth in Article I, Section 3, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitu-
tion: "No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to
the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that
State for which he shall be chosen.' 12
The qualifications for the office of U.S. Representative are estab-
lished by and set forth in Article I, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S.
Constitution: "No Person shall be a Representative who shall not
have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years
a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be
an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.' 3 Thus,
8. Id. § 421(3).
9. Id § 421(4).
10. L.D. 1983, § 2 (116th Legis. 1993).
11. The Equal Protection Clause challenge was premised on the fact that the citi-
zens of Maine would not be equally represented in Congress, since the powerful
positions in that body would be held by individuals from states which did not forbid
their representatives from accumulating seniority.
12. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
13. Id. § 2, cl. 2.
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there are no constitutional qualifications for being elected to Con-
gress other than the qualifications for age, citizenship, and residence
in the state being represented.
Historically, the English House of Commons and the colonial leg-
islatures recognized a wide variety of qualifications and permitted
the exclusion or expulsion of representatives for a wide variety of
reasons.' 4 This all came to a head, however, with the exclusion of
John Wilkes from Parliament in 1764.11 During the previous year,
Mr. Wilkes, while serving in the House of Commons, wrote an arti-
cle criticizing a peace treaty with France. He claimed that the treaty
was a result of bribery and corruption in the Cabinet.16 The article
led to Mr. Wilkes's arrest, trial, and twenty-two month imprison-
ment for seditious libel.'7 Despite the article and Mr. Wilkes's con-
viction, he was repeatedly reelected to Parliament.' Upon each
election, the Parliament refused to seat him.19
Mr. Wilkes's struggle and advocacy of libertarian causes became a
rallying cry in both England and in the Colonies.20 In America, Mr.
Wilkes became a hero in the struggle for liberty:
[T]he cry of "Wilkes and Liberty" echoed loudly across the
Atlantic Ocean as wide publicity was given to every step of
Wilkes's public career in the colonial press .... The reaction
in America took on significant proportions. Colonials tended
to identify their cause with that of Wilkes. They saw him as a
popular hero and a martyr to the struggle for liberty.... They
named towns, counties, and even children in his honour.2 1
In 1782, the House of Commons vindicated Mr. Wilkes, voted to
expunge his record, and held that its efforts in previously excluding
him from office were "subversive of the rights of the whole body of
electors of this kingdom." The Parliament simultaneously ended
the arbitrary exercise of power to exclude members from the House
of Commons in favor of the "indisputable right [of the people] to
return whom they thought proper" to the legislature3p Five years
later, Mr. Wilkes's victory was well-remembered by the Founding
14. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 523-32 nn.46-59 (1969).
15. Id. at 527-28.
16. Id
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 528.
20. Id at 530-31. During a House of Commons debate in 1781. a member re-
marked that expelling Mr. Wilkes had been one of the great causes creating a divi-
sion between England and America. Id. at 532 n.60 (citing R. PosToATE, THAT
DEVIL WaVIKEs, 171-72, 173-74 (1929)).
21. Id at 531 (citing 11 L. GIPSON, THE BRrIISH EImnRE BEFORE THE AMIERICAN
REvoLUTION 222 (1965)).
22. Id. at 528 (citing 22 PAR_ HIST. ENG. 1411 (1782)).
23. Id. at 527, 535.
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Fathers who attended the Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia.
By July 1787, the Founding Fathers had agreed to an age qualifica-
tion for membership in both the Senate and the House.' A bitter
debate then ensued over the proposal from George Mason of Vir-
ginia to add qualifications requiring property ownership, citizenship,
and financial solvency.25 James Madison, perhaps echoing the
Wilkes debate in England, led the way in arguing for fixed, minimal
qualifications that could not be tampered with by any governmental
body and stated that Mr. Mason's proposal would vest
an improper & dangerous power in the Legislature. The qual-
ifications of electors and elected were fundamental articles in
a Republican Govt. and ought to be fixed by the Constitution.
If the Legislature could regulate those of either, it can by de-
grees subvert the Constitution. A Republic may be converted
into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the number
capable of being elected, as the number authorised to elect....
It was a power also, which might be made subservient to the
views of one faction agst. another. Qualifications founded on
artificial distinctions may be devised, by the stronger in order
to keep out partizans of [a weaker] faction.26
Madison emphasized his Wilkesian argument for fixed, limited
qualifications in Federalist paper number 57:
Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen
whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confi-
dence of his country. No qualifications of wealth, of birth, of
religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the
judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people.27
The Federalists also argued that rotation-the 18th century term
for "term limits"-was incompatible with the people's right to
choose.28 Alexander Hamilton, in this same vein, argued that the
need for reelection was more effective than mandatory term limits
because the representative knows that his future is in the hands of
his constituents. 29
In addition, the ratification debates confirm the understanding of
the Framers that the Qualifications Clauses could not be added to or
altered. James Madison, in Federalist paper number 52, proclaimed
24. Id. at 532.
25. IL at 532-33.
26. Id. at 533-34 (quoting THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
249-50 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)).
27. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1857 (1995)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 351 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961)).
28. Id. at 1860.
29. Id. (citing statement of Alexander Hamilton (June 17, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES 320 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1876)).
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the intent of the Qualifications Clauses to be an open door for virtu-
ally all candidates:
The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and
properly defined by the state constitutions, and being at the
same time more susceptible of uniformity, have been very
properly considered and regulated by the convention ...
Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the
federal government is open to merit of every description,
whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and with-
out regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession
or religious faith.30
Madison's message is clear and resounding. Unlike those in the
states, the qualifications for federal candidates were carefully
thought out, properly defined-and are to be uniform throughout
the nation and open to all candidates.
Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist paper number 60, was even
more direct: "The qualifications of the persons who may choose or
be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined
and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the
legislature." 31
After due consideration and debate, the Constitutional Conven-
tion approved-and the States ratified-a Constitution with no
qualifications other than minimal age, citizenship, and residency re-
quirements. As set forth above, these minimal requirements were
carefully thought out and debated. The Founding Fathers were, in
their time, revolutionaries who believed in political democracy.
Very few of their contemporaries in Europe placed trust in the abil-
ity of the "masses" to choose a responsible government. Instead,
traditional liberal thinkers favored "noblesse oblige," a philosophy
whereby the upper classes were obligated to act benevolently to-
ward their less fortunate countrymen. The framework promulgated
by the Founding Fathers was radically different: citizens were to
have an equal say in their destiny.
The minimal requirements of the Qualifications Clauses were,
therefore, not a brief summary of restrictions for candidates, but a
fundamental political statement of the Founding Fathers' faith and
trust in democratic principles. Virtually anyone could run for polit-
ical office. The only meaningful exclusion from political office was
the vote of one's fellow citizens. These profound declarations of de-
mocracy were to be exclusive and unalterable.
30. TmE FErDRA=Sr No. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
31. Tm FEDERALIST No. 60, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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These minimal requirements were later upheld by Congress in
1807.32 At that time, the qualifications of Representative William
McCreery of Maryland were challenged because he did not satisfy
an additional residency requirement imposed by that State.33 The
Chairman of the House Committee of Elections, considering Mr.
McCreery's exclusion, determined that the States did not have the
power to add further qualifications and that restrictions upon voters
to choose their representatives must be limited to those "'abso-
lutely necessary for the safety of the society.' "34 The Chairman of
the House Committee on Elections further elaborated that the nar-
row qualifications established by the Founding Fathers cannot be al-
tered by either the Congress or the States:
The Committee of Elections considered the qualifications of
members to have been unalterably determined by the Federal
Convention, unless changed by an authority equal to that
which framed the Constitution at first; that neither the State
nor the Federal Legislatures are vested with authority to add
to those qualifications, so as to change them.35
The full House of Representatives-comprised of many of the origi-
nal Framers and their followers-subsequently resolved that Repre-
sentative McCreery was entitled to his seat.36 In a private letter
commenting on this congressional debate, Thomas Jefferson noted
that "to add new qualifications to those of the Constitution would
be as much an alteration as to detract from them."37
Thus, the Founding Fathers spent a considerable amount of time
considering the qualifications of U.S. senators and representatives.
The resounding consensus of the Framers was that the fundamental
dictates of democracy mandated minimal, unalterable qualifications
upon elected representatives. The Founding Fathers placed their ul-
timate faith in the ability of the voters to make the right choice.
Viewed in the context of a world of monarchs, this was a truly revo-
lutionary concept.
IV. THE ExPULSION OF ADAM CLAYTON POWELL, JR.
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. was a representative from New York
and Chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor. In 1966,
32. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 542-43 (1969) (quoting 17 ANNALS OF
CONG. 871-74, 1237 (1807)).
33. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1861 (1995);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 542.
34. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 543 (quoting 17 ANNALS OF CONO. 874
(1807)).
35. United States Term Limits, Inc., v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1861 (quoting Pow-
ell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 542-43 (quoting 17 ANNALS OF CONO. 872 (1807))).
36. Id
37. lId at 1861-62 (quoting from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (Jan. 31,
1814), in 14 WRmNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON at 82 (Andrew Lipscomb ed., 1904)).
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a congressional subcommittee determined that Representative Pow-
ell wrongfully had diverted Committee funds to himself and had di-
rected that certain illegal salary payments be made to his wife.38 He
was removed from his committee chairmanship and expelled from
the House of Representatives.39 He and thirteen of his constituents
challenged the expulsion on the grounds that a representative could
only be expelled if he or she failed to meet the minimal qualifica-
tions of age, citizenship, or residency. 4'
Chief Justice Earl Warren's opinion in Powell v. McCormack4 ' is
both a legal masterpiece and the definitive writing on the Qualifica-
tions Clauses. In Powell, the U.S. Supreme Court traced the foun-
dations of the Qualifications Clauses from 1553 to the
Constitutional Convention-and concluded that the records of the
debates of the Founding Fathers, "viewed in the context of the bitter
struggle for the right to freely choose representatives which had re-
cently concluded in England and in light of the distinction the Fram-
ers made between the power to expel and the power to exclude,"
mandated that Congress could expel one of its members based only
on age, citizenship, or residency.42 "Our examination of the rele-
vant historical materials leads us to the conclusion that petitioners
are correct and that the Constitution leaves the House without au-
thority to exclude any person, duly elected by his constituents, who
meets all the requirements of membership expressly prescribed in
the Constitution. '4 3 In other words, the Article I qualificatons for
federal candidates are exclusive and cannot be added to by
Congress.
The Powell decision reaffirmed the fundamental tenet of democ-
racy embodied in the Qualifications Clauses: The popular choice of
the people shall prevail, regardless of any other considerations. In
laying down the fixed and minimal qualifications required for
elected representatives, the Framers placed absolute faith in the
judgment of the people and in the rule of democracy. The Supreme
Court in Powell held that these principles are inalterable and cannot
be overcome by the personal shortcomings of Representative
Powell."
Due to its exhaustive and thorough analysis of the history of the
Qualifications Clauses, Powell has become the modem focal point
for all cases on the qualifications of federally elected officials. Its
progeny also clearly established that states, as well as Congress, are
38. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 489-90.
39. ld at 490, 493.
40. Id. at 493. All parties agreed that Congressman Powell had satisfied these
three minimal qualifications.
41. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
42. Id at 532.
43. Id. at 522 (footnote omitted).
44. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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precluded from adding qualifications.45 Indeed, every federal and
state court to consider this issue determined that the Qualifications
Clauses are exclusive and inalterable. 46 The courts have, for exam-
ple, invalidated efforts by the states to add district residency require-
ments,47 felony disqualifications 4 disloyalty qualifications,4 9 and
disqualification of state officials.5"
V. QUALIFICATIONS VERSUS ELECTION PROCEDURES
One area left open by Powell, however, is the distinction between
what is a "qualification" for the purposes of the Qualifications
Clauses and what is a bona fide election procedure. This Author
believes that a bona fide election procedure is a procedural require-
ment which can be satisfied by meeting a guideline, such as gather-
ing a reasonable number of signatures. A "qualification," on the
other hand, is an insurmountable bar to running for federal office.
Because term limits legislation has the practical effect of preventing
a candidate from winning an election, it is an unconstitutional
qualification.
Article I, Section 4, Clause 1, of the Constitution authorizes the
states to establish the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elec-
tions for Senators and Representatives .... ." These procedural re-
strictions are not qualifications for candidates, but are intended to
ensure that the election process is executed freely and appropri-
ately. Without appropriate election procedures, the democratic pro-
cess easily could erode into disorderly or corrupt elections. As set
forth by the Supreme Court in Storer v. Brown, "there must be a
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest
45. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1861-64; see also
Lowenstein, supra note 5, at 19, 43-44 n.170-73.
46. United States Term Limits, Inc. v Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1861-64; see also
Lowenstein, supra note 5, at 43-44.
47. Hellmann v. Collier, 141 A.2d 908 (Md. 1958); State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans,
446 P.2d 445 (N.M. 1968).
48. Application of Ferguson, 294 N.Y.S.2d 174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd 294
N.Y.S.2d 989 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968); In re O'Connor, 17 N.Y.S.2d 758 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1940); Danielson v. Fitzsimmons, 44 N.W.2d 484 (Minn. 1950); State ex rel. Eaton v.
Schmahl, 167 N.W. 481 (Minn. 1918).
49. Shub v. Simpson, 76 A.2d 332 (Md. 1950), appeal dismissed, 340 U.S. 881
(1950); In re O'Connor, 17 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1940).
50. State ex reL Pickrell v. Senner, 375 P.2d 728 (Ariz. 1962); Stockton v. McFar-
land, 106 P.2d 328 (Ariz. 1940); Buckingham v. State ex rel. Killoran, 35 A.2d 903,
905 (Del. 1944); Lowe v. Fowler, 240 S.E.2d 70 (Ga. 1977); State ex rel. Handley v.
Superior Court of Marion County, 151 N.E.2d 508 (Ind. 1958); Richardson v. Hare,
160 N.W.2d 883, 887-88 (Mich. 1968); State ex rel Santini v. Swackhamer, 521 P.2d
568 (Nev. 1974); Riley v. Cordell, 194 P.2d 857 (Okla. 1948); Ekwall v. Stadelman, 30
P.2d 1037 (Or. 1934); In re Opinion of Judges, 116 N.W.2d 233 (S.D. 1962); State ex
rel Wettengel v. Zimmerman, 24 N.W.2d 504 (Wis. 1946). See also Cobb v. State,
722 P.2d 1032 (Haw. 1986).
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and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the
democratic processes."'"
In Storer, the Court examined a provision of the California Elec-
tions Code that forbade an individual from putting his name on the
ballot as an independent candidate in a general election if that indi-
vidual had registered with a political party within one year prior to
the preceding primary election.' The Code also required independ-
ent candidates to have nomination papers signed by not fewer than
five percent nor more than six percent of the entire vote cast in the
preceding general election and included restrictions on when the sig-
natures must be obtained and submitted. 3 The aggrieved political
candidates claimed, among other things, that these restrictions vio-
lated the Qualifications Clauses.54 The State, on the other hand,
argued that these election restrictions were consistent with its right
and obligation to govern the time, place, and manner of elections.5 5
The Court noted that previous decisions had allowed states "to limit
voting to residents, to require registration for voting, to close the
registration books at some point prior to the election,"5 6 to require
that independent candidates demonstrate substantial support in the
community by getting signatures on nomination papers,' and to
regulate the number of candidates on the ballot.5 8 With respect to
restrictions limiting the ability of candidates to leave a political
party and run as independents, the Court upheld the ballot restric-
tions as a valid means of governing the election process.5 9 The
51. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
52. Id at 726.
53. Id at 727.
54. Id at 727-28. The four candidates in this action all sought to run in the 1972
California general election. Wo of the candidates, Storer and Frommhagen. had
been registered with the Democratic Party until early in 1972. The other two candi-
dates, Hall and Tyner, were members of the Communist Party but were not able to
run under that party affiliation because that party had not qualified for ballot posi-
tion in California. Id
55. Id at 729-30.
56. Id at 730-31 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)). The Court,
however, invalidated the Tennessee one-year residency requirement for voting. Id
at 730.
57. Id at 732 (citing Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971)).
58. Id at 732.
The Court has recognized that a State has a legitimate interest in regulat-
ing the number of candidates on the ballot. In so doing, the State under-
standably and properly seeks to prevent the clogging of its election
machinery, avoid voter confusion, and assure that the winner is the choice
of a majority, or at least a strong plurality, of those voting, without the
expense and burden of runoff elections.... Moreover, a State has an inter-
est, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political processes from
frivolous or fraudulent candidacies.
Id at 732-33 (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972)) (citations
omitted).
59. Id at 735-36.
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State, the Court reasoned, was not forbidding the individuals from
running for office; rather, it was simply protecting the integrity of
the political process by not allowing people recently registered in a
political party to switch out of the party and run as independents. 60
The Court also found that it was a reasonable election restriction to
require that independents demonstrate that they had voter support
by requiring nomination petitions since independent candidates, un-
like candidates in a Republican or Democratic primary, do not have
to survive a primary election. 61 The Court, however, invalidated the
California nomination petition provision as being so severe that it
effectively precluded a candidate from running.
62
Thus, states have broad powers to regulate the time, place, and
manner of elections. They exceed their authority, however, when
the election restrictions become insurmountable. Once this line is
crossed, the statute is deemed to have the substantive effect of ex-
cluding a candidate from the ballot.
Similarly, in Hopfmann v. Connolly, the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit upheld a Massachusetts Democratic
Party requirement that a candidate must receive fifteen percent of
the vote at the State Democratic Convention before he can chal-
lenge the convention's endorsement in the state primary election. 63
The First Circuit specifically found that this was an election proce-
dure, not an additional qualification, because the candidate still had
other means to run for election:
[T]he 15 percent rule does not add a qualification that pre-
cludes [the candidate] from obtaining the office of United
States Senator. The rule merely adds a restriction on who may
run in the Democratic party primary for statewide political of-
fice and potentially become the party nominee....
... Failure to comply with the 15 percent rule does not
render a candidate ineligible for the office of United States
Senator. An individual is free to run as the candidate of an-
other party, as an independent, or as a write-in candidate.
64
Again, the practical distinction between a bona fide election re-
striction and an unconstitutional qualification appears to be whether
the restriction is surmountable. The Democratic Party restriction in
Hopfinann was found to be surmountable since the candidate could
run in another party, run as an independent, or run as a write-in
candidate. The restriction, in essence, simply governed who could
60. Id at 736.
61. Id at 738-40.
62. Id at 738-39.
63. Hopfmann v. Connolly, 746 F.2d 97, 102-03 (1st Cir. 1984).
64. I
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run in a Democratic Party election.65 An election procedure requir-
ing a reasonable amount of nomination signatures is acceptable be-
cause it is surmountable: The candidate can go out and collect the
signatures. Where the "procedure" cannot be reasonably satisfied,
it becomes an unconstitutional qualification for running for office.
Term limits are an insurmountable qualification. Once an individ-
ual has completed the number of allotted terms, he or she is pre-
cluded from placing his or her name on the ballot. This restriction
cannot be overcome. Therefore, term limits are a qualification for
office, in addition to age, citizenship, and residency-and violate the
exclusivity of the Qualifications Clauses of the Constitution.
The drafters of the term limits legislation will no doubt argue that
term limits are not an insurmountable restriction because candidates
may still run for office by means of a write-in campaign. Such a
campaign, however, is not practical and the barriers to a statewide
write-in election make the chances of winning unrealistic. Thus,
under Storer, term limits-even with a write-in option-would not
be permitted. There, the Court found that it was unreasonable to
require an independent candidate to have nomination papers signed
by five percent of the eligible voters within a specific, short time
frame. The Court found that this restriction was unduly burden-
some and did not serve any state purpose consistent with regulating
the time, place, and manner of elections. This is also true with the
restriction for term limitations. Requiring a candidate to forego
placing his or her name on the ballot and to pursue a write-rn cam-
paign is an extraordinarily burdensome barrier to election. This
barrier also has no relationship to the state's legitimate purposes in
regulating the time, place, and manner of elections. The very lack of
a relationship demonstrates that term limitations laws are unconsti-
tutional violations of the Qualifications Clauses.
VI. UNITED STA TES TERM Lmirrs, INc v. THORVTON
The Thornton case arose out of the aforementioned nationwide
effort to impose term limits on members of Congress. On Novem-
ber 3, 1992, the voters of Arkansas amended their State Constitu-
tion and limited the terms of their federal and state
representatives.66 The preamble of the Arkansas amendment is, in
many respects, similar to the preamble of the Maine Congressional
Term Limitations Act of 1994:
65. Practically speaking, however, Massachusetts politics, at least at the time of
Hopfmann, was so dominated by the Democratic Party that the plaintiff might effec-
tively have been barred from being elected to office.
66. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1845. The so-called
"Term Limitation Amendment" became the Seventy-Third Amendment to the Ar-
kansas Constitution. It
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The people of Arkansas find and declare that elected offi-
cials who remain in office too long become preoccupied with
reelection and ignore their duties as representatives of the
people. Entrenched incumbency has reduced voter participa-
tion and has led to an electoral system that is less free, less
competitive, and less representative than the system estab-
lished by the Founding Fathers. Therefore, the people of Ar-
kansas, exercising their reserved powers, herein limit the
terms of the elected officials. 67
As with the Maine Act, the names of U.S. Representatives from
Arkansas who have served more than three terms may not be placed
on the ballot, and the names of U.S. Senators from Arkansas may
not be placed on the ballot if that individual has served two terms. 68
As in Maine, those individuals precluded from placing their names
on the ballot can still pursue the option of a write-in campaign.6 9
Responding to a challenge to the Arkansas constitutional amend-
ment by the League of Women Voters of Arkansas and other Ar-
kansas voters, the Supreme Court invalidated the amendment in a
five to four decision in Thornton on May 22, 1995.70 Writing for five
members of the Court (including Justice Kennedy, who concurred in
a separate opinion), Justice Stevens found that the Arkansas consti-
tutional amendment violated the Qualifications Clauses of the U.S.
Constitution and ruled that the only limits that can be imposed on
candidates for Congress are for age, a specific period of U.S. citizen-
ship, and a requirement of residency in the state from which election
is sought.71 Relying heavily on Powell, the Court found that the Ar-
kansas-imposed restriction is "contrary to the 'fundamental princi-
ple of our representative democracy,' embodied in the Constitution,
that 'the people should choose whom they please to govern
them.' ,,72 In summary, the majority found that any other limitation
would be contrary to the intent of our Founding Fathers and would
impair fundamentally the constitutional commitment to representa-
tive democracy. 73
The Thornton Court followed Powell in reviewing the extensive
history of the Qualifications Clauses in English common law, in the
debates before the Constitutional Convention, and after the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution. Based on this examination of Wilkes's
67. 1d
68. Id at 1846.
69. Id at 1868.
70. Id at 1842, 1846, 1867.
71. Id. at 1850 & n.9 (citing 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
123 (Max Farrand ed., 1911); 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 625 (3d ed. 1858); C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION 421 (1947)).
72. Id. at 1845 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
73. Id at 1845, 1856.
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"'long and bitter struggle for the right of the British electorate to be
represented by men of their own choice,' ",,7 Madison's "Wdkesian"
concern that a republic could be converted into an aristocracy or
oligarchy by limiting the number of individuals capable of being
elected,75 and Alexander Hamilton's " 'immutability of the qualifi-
cations set forth in the Constitution,' "76 the Thornton Court reaf-
firmed the holding in Powell that "history shows that, with respect to
Congress, the Framers intended the Constitution to establish fixed
qualifications."77
Justice Stevens also emphasized that his ruling and the holding in
Powell did not rely solely upon historical evidence, but also were
based upon" 'an examination of the basic principles of a democratic
system.' ,8 Allowing "Congress to impose additional qualifications
would violate that 'fundamental principle of our representative de-
mocracy... "that the people should choose whom they please to
govern them."' " 9 First, the Court, following Powell, "emphasized
the egalitarian concept that the opportunity to be elected was open
to all" regardless of age, wealth, profession, or religion-and that
any limitation on candidates would operate to narrow the spectrum
of elected representatives.8 0 Second, the Thornton Court followed
Powell by recognizing that placing sovereignty into the hands of the
people meant that the people and only the people should dictate
who would control them."' The Court relied on comments by many
of the Founding Fathers,' including an observation that Alexander
Hamilton made before the New York Convention: "The true princi-
ple of a republic is, that the people should choose whom they please
to govern them. Representation is imperfect in proportion as the
current of popular favor is checked. This great source of free gov-
ernment, popular election, should be perfectly pure, and the most
unbounded liberty allowed. 83 Any restriction upon popular choice
was, in the eyes of the Court, a threat upon sovereignty.8
74. Id. at 1848 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 528).
75. Id. at 1849 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 534 (quoting 2
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 250 (Max Farrand ed., 1911))).
76. Id (quoting Powell v. McCormack. 395 U.S. at 540).
77. Id. at 1850.
78. Id. (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 548).
79. Id. (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 547 (quoting statement of
Alexander Hamilton (June 17, 1788), in 2 Et.uoT's DEBATES 18 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., 1876))).
80. Id
81. Id. at 1851.
82. Id
83. Id (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 540-41 (quoting statement of
Alexander Hamilton (June 17, 1788), in 2 ELuo's DEBATEs 257 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., 1876))).
84. Id.
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The Thornton Court, after emphatically reiterating large tracts of
the Powell decision, reaffirmed the holding that the qualifications
for elected representatives in the Constitution are "fixed" and may
not be added to by Congress.85 The majority opinion then ex-
panded upon Powell by ruling that states were also barred from cre-
ating additional qualifications upon federal candidates. The Court
observed, as set forth above, that every federal and state court that
had considered this issue had unanimously determined that states
did not have the authority to alter the Qualifications Clauses of the
Constitution. 6 The Court also expressed concern that allowing in-
dividual states to formulate different qualifications for their repre-
sentatives would result in a patchwork of differing systems that
would be inconsistent with the Framers' vision of "a uniform na-
tional system ... creating a direct link between the National Gov-
ernment and the people of the United States.
8 7
The majority of the Court was also unimpressed by the argument
that the Arkansas incumbents would not be excluded from the polit-
ical process because they could still mount write-in campaigns. Not-
ing that write-in campaigns do not have a significant chance of
victory, the Court held that limiting incumbents to write-in cam-
paigns perverts the intent of the Qualifications Clauses and
trivializes the basic principles of our democracy that underlie
those Clauses. Petitioners' argument treats the Qualifications
Clauses not as the embodiment of a grand principle, but rather
as empty formalism. "It is inconceivable that guaranties [sic]
85. Id. at 1852.
86. l& at 1852-53 (citing Chandler v. Howell, 175 P. 569 (Wash. 1918); Eckwall v.
Stadelman, 30 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Ore. 1934); Stockton v. McFarland, 106 P.2d 328, 330
(Ariz. 1940); State ex reL Johnson v. Crane, 197 P.2d 864 (Wyo. 1948); Dillon v.
Fiorina, 340 F. Supp. 729, 731 (N.M. 1972); Stack v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 1295, 1297-
98 (N.D. Fla. 1970); Buckingham v. State, 35 A.2d 903, 905 (Del. 1944); Stumpf v.
Lau, 839 P.2d 120, 123 (Nev. 1992); Danielson v. Fitzsimmons, 44 N.W.2d 484, 486
(Minn. 1950); In re Opinion of Judges, 116 N.W.2d 233, 234 (S.D. 1962)). Courts
have struck down state-imposed qualifications in the form of term limits, see, e.g.,
Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068, 1081 (W.D. Wash. 1994); Stumpf v. Lau,
839 P.2d at 123, district residency requirements, see, e.g., Hellmann v. Collier, 141
A.2d 908, 911 (Md. 1958); Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp. at 731; Exon v. Tiemann,
279 F. Supp. 609, 613 (D. Neb. 1968); State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 446 P.2d 445, 448
(N.M. 1968) (per curiam), loyalty oath requirements, see, e.g., Shub v. Simpson, 76
A.2d 332, 341 (Md. 1950), appeal dismissed, 340 U.S. 881 (1950); In re O'Connor, 17
N.Y.S.2d 758, 760 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940), and restrictions on those convicted of felo-
nies, see, e.g., Application of Ferguson, 294 N.Y.S.2d 174, 176 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968);
Danielson v. Fitzsimmons, 44 N.W.2d at 486; State ex rel. Eaton v. Schmahl, 167
N.W. 481 (Minn. 1918) (per curiam)).
87. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1855 (citing FERC
v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 791 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part)).
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embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus
be manipulated out of existence.as
The Thornton Court, accordingly, declared that term limits were not
a time, place, and manner restriction, and that the Arkansas consti-
tutional amendment was an impermissible effort to dress an uncon-
stitutional qualification in "ballot access clothing."'
Thus, the Court in Thornton unequivocally laid down the law. No
qualifications can be imposed upon members of Congress other than
the minimal age, citizenship, and residency requirements set forth in
the Constitution. Neither the states nor the voters themselves can
impose further qualifications. The Court categorically ruled that
term limits are an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote:
"Term limits, like any other qualification for office, unquestionably
restrict the ability of voters to vote for whom they wish."9 0 Such a
limitation, according to the Court, "would effect a fundamental
change in the constitutional framework.""1 The remedy for voters
who do not like a candidate or believe that he is entrenched, as ar-
gued long ago by Alexander Hamilton, is to vote for somebody else.
The Thornton majority's careful reliance on history and the over-
riding principles of democracy is, in fact, the correct analysis. The
historical record, as exemplified in the statements of many prestigi-
ous Framers, overwhelmingly indicates that the qualifications for
federal candidates could not be expanded by Congress or by any
State, short of a constitutional amendment. The overriding princi-
ples of democracy also dictate that the electoral franchise cannot be
limited by even the people themselves. The unique concept intro-
duced to the world in the Constitution is "We the People."' Our
sovereign is not a king, a congress, or a series of so-called "sover-
eign" states. The sovereignty in this nation is held by the people
themselves, that is, the people who vote in any given election. These
individuals, wisely or unwisely, determine who is to be elected-and
their decisions cannot be altered by the Congress, by the States, or
by a previous electorate. In recognizing these principles, the Thorn-
ton majority acted appropriately in striking down the Arkansas con-
stitutional amendment on term limitations.
88. 1l at 1868 (quoting, in part, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 (1960)
(quoting Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583. 594
(1926))).
89. ld. at 1857 (quoting United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W2d 349,
357 (Ark. 1994)). The Court did not directly address the State's argument that
Storer held a primary restriction to be a procedural restriction, not an unconstitu-
tional exclusion, because, among other reasons, the candidates could still mount a
write-in campaign. By ignoring this distinction, the Thornton Court glossed over a
poorly thought-out statement in Storer.
90. Id. at 1871.
91. Id.
92. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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Justice Kennedy, who cast the deciding vote, concurred with the
majority decision for different reasons. His opinion is founded upon
the essential concept of federalism, rather than the exclusivity of the
Qualifications Clauses. Specifically, the concurrence views federal-
ism as one of this country's greatest achievements:
Federalism was our Nation's own discovery. The Framers
split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea
that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state
and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.
The resulting Constitution created a legal system unprece-
dented in form and design, establishing two orders of govern-
ment, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its
own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who
sustain it and are governed by it.93
According to Justice Kennedy, a citizen's relationship with the fed-
eral government and with his state government are two separate and
distinct sovereign relationships, and one relationship has no right or
authority to impose upon the other. Thus, a state may not dictate
the qualifications of a candidate for federal office. In the words of
the concurrence, "[T]here exists a federal right of citizenship, a rela-
tionship between the people of the Nation and their National Gov-
ernment, with which the States may not interfere." 4
Justice Kennedy, however eloquent, does not say anything funda-
mentally different from the majority decision. The majority opinion,
relying heavily on Powell, focuses on the democratic principles un-
derlying the sovereign right of the electorate to vote for their repre-
sentatives in Congress.95 This sovereign right to choose one's
national leaders without the interference of the Congress, the States,
or the electorate itself is what Justice Kennedy appropriately called
federalism. The thrust of his opinion reflects the same roots and
ideas set forth in the majority decision.
In contrast to the majority opinion and concurrence, the dissent,
written by Justice Thomas and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice O'Connor, and Justice Scalia, focuses more on ideological
points. The dissenting opinion begins by noting that the text of the
Qualifications Clauses is silent both as to whether states can add
additional qualifications to federal candidates and as to whether
each state has the power to set forth eligibility requirements for fed-
eral candidates.96 This silence, the conservative authors of the dis-
sent contend, cannot mean anything other than that the right to
make additional qualifications on federal officials is reserved to the
93. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1872 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
94. Id. at 1875.
95. Id at 1851.
96, Id. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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states or to the people.97 In other words, the Constitution states
certain requirements. No prohibitions or affirmative obligations can
be read into its silence. Whenever a certain clause does not ex-
pressly state that it is exclusive and fixed, the power to add qualifica-
tions belongs to the states or to the people pursuant to the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments. The decision as to whether the power be-
longs to the states or to the people is to be determined by the State
Constitution.98 The dissent contends that the Arkansas Constitu-
tion, by virtue of the term limitations amendment, gives the State of
Arkansas the reserved power to add unique qualifications to their
federally elected officials.99
The dissent is correct that the Qualifications Clauses are techni-
cally silent as to whether the qualifications for age, residency, and
citizenship are the minimum qualifications or whether they are the
exclusive and unalterable qualifications. It ignores, however, the
lessons of the rich constitutional history reviewed and analyzed by
both Powell and by the majority decision. This history overwhelm-
ingly demonstrates that the Founding Fathers intended not to add to
these qualifications.
The conservative dissenting justices also ignore the fundamental
principles of democracy that motivated the revolutionary Framers of
our society. The electoral franchise was thrown open to the masses
more than it ever had been before. The decision as to who would
run this nation ultimately was left to the citizens themselves, not to
the Congress, the states, or some other form of power elite. The
Founding Fathers, as the historical record demonstrates, clearly in-
tended that nothing but the minimal qualifications set forth in the
Constitution would come between a citizen and the right of that citi-
zen to vote for the candidate of his choice. Assuming that the mi-
nority is correct and that states such as Arkansas are free to add
qualifications to candidates, states would have the power to erode
the democratic vision of the Framers. For example, one state, in its
wisdom, may determine that electing educated representatives is in
the best interests of the state and require that all of its federal candi-
dates have a college degree from an accredited institution of higher
learning. Another state could determine that people who own land
have a greater stake in their society and require that its candidates
own land as a precondition for running for office. Another state
may determine that morality is an essential ingredient in elected
representatives and require that all candidates have a firm back-
ground and commitment in a widely accepted branch of the Chris-
tian faith.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1876-78.
99. Id. at 1877.
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All of this, however, was emphatically not the vision of our
Founding Fathers. These great visionaries cast down a gauntlet
before the world and demonstrated that opening up the electoral
franchise as widely as possible enriches freedom and the success of
our nation. The Qualifications Clauses were expressly intended, in
this vein, to allow the voters the broadest choice possible from
which to choose their representatives.
VII. CONCLUSION
The broad and expansive discussion of the Qualifications Clauses
in the majority opinion puts to rest the critical issues surrounding
the constitutionality of the Maine Act and vindicates the challenge
mounted by the League of Women Voters of Maine. The United
States District Court for the District of Maine, following the lead of
the Supreme Court, "Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed that the
Maine Congressional Term Limitations Act of 1994 is invalid and
unconstitutional," and "Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed that De-
fendants G. William Diamond and Andrew Ketterer, in their official
capacities as Maine Secretary of State and Attorney General respec-
tively, are permanently enjoined from implementing, carrying out,
or enforcing any of the terms of this Act."' 00
The Thornton decision and the invalidating of the Maine Act are
a clear victory for the civil liberties of voters. One of the fundamen-
tal principles of democratic government is the ability of voters to
choose whomever they wish to run for elective office. The Founding
Fathers considered property qualifications, religious qualifications,
moral qualifications, and term limits-and rejected all of these limi-
tations in favor of very straightforward and minimal age, citizenship,
and residency qualifications. In a true democracy, the only qualifi-
cation on holding office is the popular support of the voters. Any
further limitation-no matter how seemingly well intended or meri-
torious-runs counter to the grain of our system of government.
Furthermore, the very election that swept in the Maine Congres-
sional Term Limitations Act of 1994 also swept out incumbent con-
gressmen and congresswomen throughout the United States. It is an
irony of American democracy that the same election that brought
term limits to Maine and other states also forced dozens of senior
congressional leaders out of office and caused the Democratic Party
to lose control of both Houses of Congress. The 1994 elections posi-
tively demonstrated that voters can change things on their own by
voting for the person of their choice. When this choice is limited, we
all lose.
100. League of Women Voters of Maine v. Diamond, No. 94-377-P-H (D. Me.
May 26, 1995).
[Vol. 48:313
1996] CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMITS 333
The Founding Fathers placed profound faith in the democratic
process and the ultimate ability of the American people to choose
responsible representatives. This was a dramatic concept at the
time, and it took a revolution for these objectives to become reality.
The history of our country has-beyond any doubt-vindicated the
fundamental concept of representative democracy. This principle is
firmly ensconced in the Constitution and in the soul of our nation.
The Court acted correctly in not allowing it to be tarnished by the
drifting winds of partisan politics.

